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       Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting*
by designation. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 08-1077
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
   v.
PHILLIP MONTGOMERY,
                                      Appellant
                          
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Crim. No. 07-cr-00349-1)
District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr., Chief Judge
                           
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 23, 2009
                           
Before: BARRY, SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,  Judge*
(Opinion Filed: July 15, 2009 )
                           
OPINION
                           
       Montgomery does not challenge his sentence on appeal.1
      The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and2
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant Phillip Montgomery, a former police officer, was convicted by a jury of
deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and one substantive count of
obstruction of justice.  The District Court sentenced Montgomery to 24 months’
imprisonment.   We are not persuaded by Montgomery’s arguments for reversal, and will1
affirm.2
I.  Factual Background
Because we write solely for the parties, we presume familiarity with the facts and
will recite only the basic underpinnings of this case.  
Phillip Montgomery formerly worked as a police officer in Asbury Park, New
Jersey.  In February 2003, while unsuccessfully attempting to execute an arrest warrant
for Jonathan Thomas, a local drug dealer, Montgomery stole Thomas’s expensive,
diamond-studded watch.  That same day, Montgomery gave the watch to Victor
Ashkenazi, a close friend and local jeweler, for safekeeping.  
Within the next couple of days, several people, including Thomas’s mother, came
into Ashkenazi’s jewelry store to ask where the watch had come from.  Ashkenazi
contacted Montgomery, who told him that “nobody can know the watch came from
[Montgomery]” and that he should tell anyone who asked that the watch was brought in
      At that point, unbeknownst to Montgomery and Rivera, the watch was in the3
possession of the FBI.
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by “some chick.”  (SA 262.)  Later, Montgomery had Ashkenazi purchase a duplicate
watch so that he could cover his tracks.  As he explained to Ashkenazi: “in case anybody
wants to know, I have the watch, what do I need another one for?”  (Id. at 263.)  
For several years, the stolen watch remained in the back room of Ashkenazi’s
jewelry store.  In the summer of 2006, however, the FBI was looking into police
corruption in Asbury Park, and suspected Montgomery of involvement in illegal
narcotics.  As part of its investigation, the FBI obtained authority to wiretap
Montgomery’s cellular telephone, and, having heard rumors of the watch theft, served a
subpoena on Ashkenazi that asked for information about his dealings with Asbury Park
police officers. 
Although Ashkenazi initially contacted Montgomery to inform him of the
subpoena, he soon began cooperating with the FBI.  During the course of this
cooperation, Ashkenazi, with the encouragement of law enforcement, attempted to get
Montgomery to incriminate himself by discussing the stolen watch over the wiretapped
phone.  Apparently concerned, Montgomery sent Efrin Rivera, a friend and later co-
defendant, into Ashkenazi’s jewelry store to retrieve the watch.  Rivera handed Ashkenazi
a note demanding the watch, but Ashkenazi refused to hand it over.   Later that same3
evening, after Ashkenazi left work, Montgomery and Rivera followed him to a local
       The Court stated in full: 4
The defense of entrapment is not raised in this case and, therefore, I’m not
providing an interpretation.  That is not part of the case.  However, the
burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.  The burden never shifts to a defendant, the law never imposes upon
the defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses,
or producing any evidence.  The government must prove each and every
element as I have instructed to you, beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to
obtain a conviction.  That is my instruction to you on the third question.
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supermarket.  Once inside, Montgomery confronted Ashkenazi, and as Ashkenazi exited
the supermarket and walked to his car, Montgomery and Rivera stared him down in an
allegedly intimidating manner. 
At trial, Montgomery testified that he had inadvertently taken the watch, only to
realize later what he had done, and panicked.  He denied any intent to intimidate
Ashkenazi, or to interfere with the federal investigation.  Unswayed, the jury convicted
Montgomery on all counts.
II.  Analysis
A.  Entrapment Defense
Montgomery first argues that the District Court improperly prevented him from
raising an entrapment defense.  This argument is bolstered by the fact that the jury, sua
sponte, sent a question to the Court asking: “Should we be considering entrapment with
regard to the defendants and if so, can you provide us with an interpretation of the law
regarding entrapment?”  (SA 1395.)  The Court instructed the jury that entrapment had
not been raised.   4
(SA 1395.)
      The government properly concedes that it wrongly argued at trial that the entrapment5
defense was waived as it was not brought as an affirmative pretrial defense.  (See
Appellee’s Br. 23-24.)
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The parties hotly dispute whether Montgomery ever tried to raise an entrapment
defense at trial, or whether he is manufacturing a new issue on appeal.  There is
conflicting evidence on this question, and we decline to wade into what is a sticky
dispute.   Even assuming entrapment was raised, the District Court acted properly in not5
allowing it to be presented to the jury because the facts of this case simply do not support
an entrapment defense.  
Entrapment is “based on the notion that it serves no justifying social objective for
the Government to create new crime for the sake of bringing charges against a person it
had persuaded to participate in wrongdoing.”  United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171,
177 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).  An entrapment defense
“focuses on the defendant himself: if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime,
then it cannot be said that the Government is responsible.”  Id. at 178.  Thus, “[t]he
element of non-predisposition to commit the offense is the primary focus of an
entrapment defense.”  United States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1989).  Before
an entrapment defense and concomitant instruction are permissible, “the defendant must
produce evidence of both non-predisposition and inducement [by the Government].”  Id.  
Montgomery presented no such evidence.  To the contrary, the evidence showed
      Montgomery’s defense was not that he lacked the predisposition to commit the6
obstruction offenses, but rather that he did not commit the offenses at all – i.e., that he
lacked, as a factual matter, the intent to obstruct.  Montgomery’s contention was that he
innocently told Ashkenazi to give back the watch, and that his confrontation with
Ashkenazi was not intended to obstruct.  The jury rejected this version of events, and the
lack of an entrapment instruction did not impede Montgomery’s presentation of his case.
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that, from the beginning, Montgomery was predisposed to commit the obstruction of
justice crimes: he asked Ashkenazi to hide the true source of the watch; he obtained a
duplicate watch to confuse investigators; he sent Rivera to get the watch; and he followed
and intimidated Ashkenazi, a material witness.  Additionally, Montgomery admitted to
the FBI in a proffer session what he intended to do with the watch if he had been able to
obtain it: “I would have thrown it in the ocean.”  (SA 741.)  
Montgomery argues that the FBI scripted Ashkenazi’s phone conversations, and
that he initially told Ashkenazi to give the watch to the FBI.  But these facts do not
support an entrapment defense.  Even assuming that the evidence supports a finding that
the FBI scripted Ashkenazi’s conversations, such scripting sheds no light on
Montgomery’s predisposition (or lack thereof).  Additionally, that Montgomery once told
Ashkenazi to give the watch to the FBI is not indicative of a lack of predisposition: to the
contrary, it is entirely consistent with his original ruse, i.e., that the watch came from
“some chick.”   (SA 262.)  6
The FBI did not induce Montgomery to commit additional crimes, but rather
investigated a crime already committed.  The FBI obtained the cooperation of a witness,
      Montgomery also argues that the District Court erred in not giving the jury an7
instruction on so-called governmental overreaching.  There was no error here: the facts do
not support the issuance of such an instruction, and, in any event, this issue is for a judge,
not a jury.  See United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1999) (defining
governmental overreaching defense as when a “defendant’s due process rights have been
violated because the government created the crime for the sole purpose of obtaining a
conviction,” and noting that it is “well-established that the issue of outrageous
government conduct is for the court, and not the jury, to resolve”).  
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and encouraged the witness to trick Montgomery into admitting involvement with the
watch theft.  The fact that Montgomery, in reaction to the federal investigation, undertook
to obstruct justice cannot be laid at the feet of the government. 
“Entrapment is a ‘relatively limited defense’ that may defeat a prosecution only
‘when the Government’s deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of
the defendant.’” Fedroff, 874 F.2d at 181 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
436 (1973)).  The facts of this case do not support an entrapment defense, and it was not
error for the District Court to prevent Montgomery from arguing the issue.7
B.  Exclusion of Expert Psychological Evidence
Montgomery also asserts that the District Court erred in excluding a report on his
mental health that the defense purportedly sought to use to negate the mens rea elements
of the crimes.  The report concluded that Montgomery had post-traumatic stress disorder,
probably had an unspecified personality disorder, and was “likely not capable of
organized clear thought” at the time of the obstruction of justice.  (See App. 174-91.)
The parties agree that this issue is governed by United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d
-8-
889 (3d Cir. 1987).  In Pohlot, we held that “evidence of mental abnormality” should be
admitted “only when, if believed, it would support a legally acceptable theory of lack of
mens rea,” i.e., that the mental abnormality would negate the specific intent for the
commission of a crime.  Id. at 905-06.  Although the report in question is littered with
sweeping legal conclusions about Montgomery’s mens rea (see App. 17 (“The mens rea
for a purposeful act to obstruct justice is highly questionable under these circumstances
unless a specific warning was given, then it would still be questionable to a lesser
degree.”)), the substance of the report does not negate the mens rea for any of the crimes.  
The report concludes that Montgomery may have stolen the watch to send a
message to Jonathan Thomas, the drug dealer.  While interesting, this conclusion does not
negate the willfulness of the theft, but rather merely posits a different motive. 
Additionally, Montgomery’s post-traumatic stress disorder, which the report argues
foreclosed his ability to engage in “organized clear thought” (id. at 191), does not negate
the intent to knowingly obstruct justice.  (See SA 1210 (jury instruction on mens rea for
obstruction) (“An act is done knowingly if it’s done voluntarily and purposely and not by
accident or mistake.  An act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally, with
specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is with bad purpose, to disobey or
disregard the law.”))  As we said in Pohlot, 
Criminal responsibility must be judged at the level of the conscious.  If a
person thinks, plans and executes the plan at that level, the criminality of his
act cannot be denied, wholly or partially, because, although he did not
realize it, his conscious was influenced to think, to plan and to execute the
      Montgomery also argues that the District Court erred in its response to two jury8
questions, and in its denial of a motion to suppress the wiretap evidence.  We have
reviewed these contentions and the voluminous record, and conclude that these arguments
are without merit. 
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plan by unconscious influences which were the product of his genes and his
lifelong environment.  
827 F.2d at 906 (quoting New Jersey v. Sikora, 210 A.2d 193, 202 (1965)). 
Nowhere does the report indicate that Montgomery was not aware or in control of
his actions.  Because the report’s observations are inapposite to the narrow issue of mens
rea, we will affirm the District Court’s exclusion of the evidence.
III.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.   8
